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TEN MYTHS ABOUT CHARACTER, VIRTUE AND VIRTUE
EDUCATION – PLUS THREE WELL-FOUNDED MISGIVINGS
by KRISTJÁN KRISTJÁNSSON, Jubilee Centre for Character and Values, University of
Birmingham
ABSTRACT: Initiatives to cultivate character and virtue in moral education
at school continue to provoke sceptical responses. Most of those echo familiar
misgivings about the notions of character, virtue and education in virtue – as
unclear, redundant, old-fashioned, religious, paternalistic, anti-democratic,
conservative, individualistic, relative and situation dependent. I expose those
misgivings as ‘myths’, while at the same time acknowledging three better–
founded historical, methodological and practical concerns about the notions
in question.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of cultivating (moral) character and virtue through virtue education
in schools continues to be described as controversial (see, for example, Evans,
2012). For those unfamiliar with the historical discourse (especially in educational
circles) on character and virtue, the controversial nature of this aim may seem
baffling. After all, the Final Report of the Riots Communities and Victims’ Panel
(2012), published in the wake of the August 2011 riots – a report that inter alia
recommended new school initiatives to help children build character – seemed to
have been warmly received by media and the general public. Yet various negative
conceptions about the notions of character, virtue and virtue education remain in
academic circles.
The negative conceptions are represented by what I would call 10 proverbial
and persistent myths about the concepts in question. I argue in Section 2 that
those myths are based on conceptual (Myths 1 and 2), historical (Myths 3 and 4),
moral (Myths 5 and 6), political (Myths 7 and 8), epistemological (Myth 9) and
psychological (Myth 10) misunderstandings or misinterpretations of character and
virtue. Although some of my deconstructions will need to be quick and rely on
references to background literatures rather than knock-down arguments, I hope to
show that the objections underlying the 10 myths are not serious stumbling blocks
to the aim of virtue education.
As some of the myths in question have in recent times, however, lost their
academic lustre (while still remaining powerful in the public consciousness and
ISSN 0007-1005 (print)/ISSN 1467-8527 (online)
© 2013 The Author(s). Published by Routledge.
This is an Open Access article. Non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly attributed, cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way, is permitted. The











































270 MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION
in public debate), I need to be careful not to passionately storm half-abandoned
forts while the adversaries have regrouped behind stronger, more defensible lines.
In Section 3, I therefore respond to three more serious misgivings about character,
virtue and virtue education (one historical, one methodological and one practical)
that I consider to be well founded and worthy of serious attention.
2. THE TEN MYTHS
Myth 1: ‘Character and Virtue are Unclear Notions’
An initial sceptical question about virtue education is what the concepts of charac-
ter and virtue really mean. Are these essentially unclear and ambiguous notions?
In comparison with the ‘closed’ concepts of mathematics and natural kinds, one
could say that they are. There is no platinum bar of good character preserved in a
French museum. However, in comparison with other standard concepts in philos-
ophy and social science, there is nothing peculiar about them. Most concepts in
those disciplines are either open-textured natural concepts (such as ‘freedom’)
or clustered family-resemblance concepts (such as ‘game’). Philosophers have
developed ways of trimming the ragged edges of such concepts through critical
revisions. Yet troublesome borderline cases will always remain. Even such a com-
mon everyday concept as that of ‘teacher’ is an open-textured one. Was Confucius
really the ‘first teacher’? I suppose that depends on the definition!
As far as open-textured concepts go, ‘character’ and ‘virtue’ have a
comparatively stable meaning in mainstream academic discourse. To start with
‘character’, Gordon Allport provided it with a concise and transparent specifica-
tion in the 1930s as ‘personality evaluated’ – and personality, in turn, as ‘character
devaluated’ (Allport, 1937, p. 52). Since then, in personality psychology, ‘charac-
ter’ has been used to refer to that sub-set of personality traits that are morally
evaluable and considered to provide persons with moral worth. Most philosophers
and educationists will take that to mean that those traits are reason-responsive and
educable. So, to give an example, conscientiousness as a personality trait (qua
one of the famous Big-Five traits in personality psychology) refers to the state of
being generally disciplined, reliable and predictable. None of these descriptions
is meant to carry any moral connotations. A crook can be conscientiousness as
such, and reliable in dealings with fellow crooks. Moreover, conscientiousness as
a personality trait may be partly inherited and hard to educate into or out of people.
In contrast, conscientiousness as a character trait (or moral conscientiousness) is
a learnt quality: a character strength or a virtue. If it so happens that the word
‘character’ is gradually losing its moral shades of meaning in ordinary parlance –
so that teachers are, for instance, quite happy to refer to such amoral capabilities or
competencies as emotional regulation and optimism as ‘character traits’ – then we
can simply insert the word ‘moral’ in front of ‘character’ to convey the standard
academic meaning.
The most pronounced and developed states of morally good character are
called ‘virtues’ and those of morally bad character ‘vices’. Again there is









































MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION 271
used – in the literature, harking all the way back to Plato and (especially) Aristotle.
Virtues and vices are taken to be settled (stable and consistent) states of charac-
ter (or hexeis in Greek), concerned with morally praiseworthy or blameworthy
conduct in significant and distinguishable spheres of human life. Each character
trait of this sort typically comprises a unique set of attention, emotion, desire and
behaviour, but also a certain comportment or style of expression, applicable in
the relevant sphere. The compassionate person thus notices easily and attends to
situations in which the lot of others has been undeservedly compromised, feels for
the needs of those who have suffered this undeserved misfortune, desires that their
misfortune be reversed, acts for the relevant (ethical) reasons in ways conducive to
that goal and exudes an outward aura of empathy and care. Individual virtues and
vices have always played a key role in moral language. Although we may blame
or praise a person for acts that we deem to be ‘out of character’, we more com-
monly praise or blame individual actions, emotions, desires and comportments as
embodiments of more general states of character. If someone acts in a cruel way,
we typically condemn not only the individual action, but also the actor for being
a cruel person – for possessing the vice of cruelty (see further in Kristjánsson,
2013).
Virtue theorists from Aristotle onwards typically claim that the virtues are not
only instrumentally related to their ultimate goal – which tends to be assumed to
be the individual’s happiness, well-being or flourishing – but are actually consti-
tutive of it. This understanding has led many theorists to make a sharp distinction
between virtues and skills, where the latter are simply instrumental to some inde-
pendent (and typically self-chosen) end. I concur with Annas (2011), however, in
that it is not helpful to yield the everyday concept of a skill wholly to the instru-
mentalists, as if they have a monopoly on it. Rather, I would follow Aristotle
in seeing virtues as human excellences of a sort, just as ordinary skills are (the
musical skills of harpist, for instance), but as differing from such ordinary skills
in their: irreplacability (whereas a harpist who gives up on the harp in order to
pursue a career in athletics, at which she is also adept, is no less of a human being,
a person who gives up on moral virtues cannot actualise her true well-being as the
virtues are constitutive of it); depth (significant changes in one’s virtues and vices
are tantamount to radical self-transformations, whereas changes in one’s reper-
toire of skills typically are not); and scope or ubiquity (whereas skills have local
functions, virtues inform globally all our encounters with others and enable us to
perform well our characteristic function as human beings).
In short, there need not be anything essentially unclear or ambiguous about
the notions of ‘character’ and ‘virtue’, and the Aristotelian formal definitions of
them provide a convenient way of making oneself understood both to academic
colleagues and the general public. However, not all virtue ethics is Aristotelian
(see further in the section on Myth 9), and it can scarcely be the aim of virtue edu-
cators to reduce the polyphony of voices on virtue ethical issues to one. The same
goes for the definition of ‘character education’ or ‘virtue education’ (I use those









































272 MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION
education’ in education circles is unfortunately limited to a certain type of charac-
ter education that blossomed in the USA towards the end of the twentieth century.
But there is no good reason to kowtow to that narrow specification. Rather, given
the definitions of ‘character’ and ‘virtue’ already proposed, ‘character education’
is best understood as any form of moral education that foregrounds the role of
virtuous character in the good life.
Myth 2: ‘Character and Virtue are Redundant Notions’
Still, even if the notions of character and virtue are clear and do have a
distinguished pedigree, they might yet be said to have been overtaken by more
contemporary notions that capture better what we aim to say by such language.
In support of this thesis, critics might cite the findings of a recent study of the
use of general and specific virtue words in 5.2 million American books published
between 1901 and 2000, which shows a steady decline in the use of traditional
virtue terms (Kesebir and Kesebir, 2012). What could such terms then have been
replaced by?
Two possibilities present themselves. One is the Big-Five Model of person-
ality: about the traits of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness
and neuroticism that are precisely alleged to capture what is most significant about
individual personal differences. Against the earlier observation that these traits
are explicitly defined such as to exclude moral content, Big-Five theorists could
respond that conscientiousness and agreeableness precisely suffice to describe the
specific characteristics of so-called virtuous people. As I have argued elsewhere
(Kristjánsson, 2013, chap. 3), however, despite advantages of the Big-Five model
for some purposes, the model suffers from arbitrariness regarding the traits that
make us ‘who we are’ in an everyday sense. By excluding moral properties from
their potential list of traits that comprise our everyday self, personality psycholo-
gists risk obscuring and diluting what is central to us. For instance, if we think of
conscientiousness as a trait that defines us in a way that is relevant to our everyday
engagements with other people, this notion seems to be exhausted by its moral
import. The same would apply, mutatis mutandis, to agreeableness. To take a
parallel example from the field of education, considerable emphasis used to be
placed on the difference between a teacher’s classroom style (which was supposed
to reflect non-moral personality traits) and a teacher’s manner (meant to capture
what was moral in relation to the teacher’s conduct). A closer look, however,
revealed that the two could not be separated for any relevant purposes. In so far as
a teacher’s ‘style’ matters in the classroom, it is because of its moral implications:
its impact on student well-being (see Kristjánsson, 2007, pp. 152–155).
The second candidate for a vocabulary that might make the notions of
character and virtue redundant is that of self-concepts (such as self-esteem, self-
regulation and self-efficacy), which were almost non-existent in public discourse
before 1990 but have since proliferated in educational discourse. As I have









































MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION 273
cognitive, constructivist and amoral paradigm of human self-hood that equates
people’s true selves with the beliefs they entertain about themselves. Bluntly,
this paradigm has wound up in a linguistic (Smith, 2006), educational (Cigman,
2004), psychological (Baumeister et al., 2003) and moral (Kristjánsson, 2010)
quagmire. We cannot do without a paradigm of self hood that understands it as
non-constructed, emotion-infused, morally engaged and often hidden from our
own view: a paradigm of what I have called ‘our actual full selves’ (Kristjánsson,
2010, pp. 25–52). The only self-concept that aims at capturing this underlying
sense of self is that of self-respect. Indeed, it may well be the case that a lot of
old-style virtue-talk has been translated in recent years into talk of self-respect
(Kristjánsson, 2010, pp. 148–166). Yet, although ‘self-respectful’ may be a help-
ful umbrella term for a person who is overall virtuous (and conscious of the
need to preserve that virtuousness), it is lacking in the necessary specificity to
designate virtue variances: for instance, the character state of a person who is
relatively strong on one virtue but weak on another. Replacing designations of
specific virtues with the term ‘self-respect’ can thus be done only at the cost of
considerable (linguistic and moral) impoverishment.
A closer look at Kesebir and Kesebir’s (2012) findings shows that while it
is true that many specific virtue terms – in addition to the generic terms ‘char-
acter’ and ‘virtue’ – have declined in use, a few have had a significant positive
correlation with time (‘compassion’, ‘integrity’, ‘fairness’, ‘tolerance’, ‘selfless-
ness’, ‘discipline’, ‘dependability’,’ reliability’) and others have remained stable
over time (‘loyality’, ‘trustworthiness’, ‘forgiveness’, ‘respect’, ‘determination’).
There is, therefore, no compelling evidence for the redundancy of the virtue
vocabulary as such. What seems to have happened, rather, is that its focus has
shifted to fewer and more general virtue terms, although the overall rationale
provided by the genus-terms ‘(good) character’ and ‘virtue’ seems to have gone
astray in the bargain. As it is unlikely that ordinary language has lost its flexibil-
ity to collocate the common elements in specific virtues, we might have to look
for new synonyms for ‘character’ and ‘virtue’ that the researchers have missed:
say ‘pro-social’ (persons, qualities). It will fall squarely within the remit of UK
character educationists, for example, to record the ways in which the virtues are
referred to in contemporary discourse in the United Kingdom – for otherwise any
future recommendations will fall on deaf ears (or, more specifically, on ears that
do not understand the employed terminology). In some cases, this may not be
enough; the need may arise to try to resuscitate some old but invaluable ways of
speaking (see section on Myth 3). Still, since no recent academic changes of fash-
ion in word-use have made talk of people of good or bad character superfluous,
the redundancy thesis can be written off as a myth.
Myth 3: ‘Character and Virtue are Old-fashioned Notions’
This claim is closely related to the last one, about redundancy. The focus here is









































274 MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION
been replaced wholesale by some newer cutting-edge one, but rather on the
impression that the whole enterprise of preserving old virtue expressions has a
quaint Victorian or even medieval feel to it. Have we not moved on from the time
when we were obsessed with chivalrous knights and stiff-upper-lipped Mr Darcys
bestriding the cultural landscape? Is it not time to sweep out the stables and finally
get rid of such noxious historical residue?
However, far from it being the case that virtue concepts are passé in
contemporary moral theory, the exact opposite seems to be true: virtue ethics is
the newest kid on the block in these quarters (see further in the section on Myth
9); and in some sub-areas of research, such as medical ethics, nursing ethics and –
arguably also – the ethics of education, it is now widely the moral theory of choice.
If Aristotle is hot in moral and educational circles (Curren, 2010), contemporary
virtue ethics is even hotter. Still, academic ivory towers are one thing and ordinary
morality another, and I did admit at the end of the previous section that some
older moral concepts might have to be ‘retrieved’ for contemporary use. Is that
not old-fashioned?
I choose to remain obstinately unrepentant here. Reviving and restoring old
concepts is not necessarily old-fashioned. Consider contemporary neo-liberalism
in economics or contemporary neo-Darwinism in biology. Both are grounded
in sets of concepts originating in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
concepts that during large chunks of the twentieth century were thought to
be ripe for the sickle. Current theorists may take exception to many aspects
of both neo-liberalism and neo-Darwinism, but their complaints are usually
based on substantive reasons, not grumbles about relevant concepts being ‘old-
fashioned’.
Elizabeth Anscombe (1958), who revived virtue ethics as a preferable alterna-
tive to the modern moral theories of deontology and utilitarianism, suggested that
ordinary moral language was alright as it is – focusing now, just as it had always
done, on human virtues and vices: on Person A’s considerateness or callousness,
Person B’s compassion or cruelty, and so on. Moral theorists simply needed to
abandon the mistaken approaches of Kant and Mill and reclaim the naturalistic
grounding of moral theory in everyday talk about human character, whether good
or bad (Anscombe, 1958). If it is true that some of that language has moved from
the centre to the fringes of public conversation in the decades since Anscombe’s
article was published (Kesebir and Kesebir, 2012), we may have valid moral rea-
sons for wanting to revive it. What is more, the people we want to revive it for
may be grateful to us for doing so. In support of that claim, consider one notable
finding from the ‘Learning for Life’ Project – the largest empirical study of char-
acter education to date in the United Kingdom, with over 70,000 respondents.
The finding that I am concerned with here is not the heartening overarching one
that young people are ‘interested in their own character and are concerned with
enhancing the good aspects’ of it (Arthur, 2010, p. 21), but rather the finding that









































MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION 275
those issues – and that, when they were provided with such a vocabulary, they
cherished it and enjoyed the opportunity to use it (2010, pp. 79–84). Many of
us may have experienced the eureka-feeling of coming across phrases, previously
unfamiliar to us, that enable us to say exactly what we mean. Thus, the idea that
aspirations to breathe new life into concepts that have fallen out of use must count
as old-fashioned may be considered another myth.
Myth 4: ‘Character and Virtue are Essentially Religious Notions’
There is no denying the fact that notions of moral character and virtue are a
mainstay of all the world’s great religions. However, the idea that ‘character’ and
‘virtue’ do not make sense or cannot be justified outside a religious context is an
historical non-starter.
In her famous paper, mentioned already, Anscombe (1958) presented moral
theorists with a gambit. To give modern moral theory the mooring it requires, the-
orists either have to return to a religion-based divine-command moral outlook or
to reinstate an Aristotelian teleology of virtue as constitutive of the ultimate end of
human life – eudaimonia – but one grounded in state-of-the-art moral psychology.
Virtue ethics in our day and age has been, more than anything else, an attempt to
flesh out a plausible and feasible account of moral virtue in post-religious terms
(see, for example, Arthur, 2010, p. 3). In this regard, while psychology may not yet
have provided us with the empirical ammunition we need to underpin a satisfac-
tory form of virtue ethics (Kristjánsson, 2013, chap. 4), the alternative of giving
up on that project altogether and opting for the other prong of Anscombe’s fork is,
in our present-day multicultural contexts, one that seems hardly to have occurred
to any contemporary virtue ethicists – irrespective of their own personal religious
commitments.
Myth 5: ‘Character and Virtue are Paternalistic Notions’
Paternalism is one of philosophy’s trickiest concepts. I shall assume here an
everyday understanding according to which an intervention X is paternalistic if
it involves Person A’s forcing X upon Person B against, or at least without regard
for, Person B’s own will, under the pretext that X is in Person B’s best inter-
ests. Is the school teaching of young students about good character paternalistic
in this sense? If so, is it a task that should be left to the discretion of their parents,
or left undone until they have become mature enough to decide for themselves?
The first issue to be determined here is whether character education at school
is against the will of parents (who typically act as proxies for younger children)
or the students themselves. The evidence suggests that the first is not the case.
Parents are typically happy if character issues are addressed at school (Seligman









































276 MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION
Study, showed great eagerness to learn more about the virtues at school (Arthur,
2010). None of this should perhaps surprise us, for as Carr puts it, it is in a way:
much clearer why it is important to encourage children to be honest, tolerant and
fair than it is why they should be taught mathematics or science, for although not all
children will develop an interest in or a need for science, all human beings require
an interest in honesty or fairness. (Carr, 1991, p. 262)
Let us suppose, however, for the sake of argument that evidence showed the
opposite; namely that parents and students would prefer schools not to address
issues of good character at all. The idea that the school could then unproblem-
atically leave such issues aside betrays a peculiar conceptual and psychological
misconception: namely that the character of children can simply be held in
abeyance at school until they reach the age where they have become wise or
autonomous enough to decide for themselves. This is a misconception both about
the meaning of the terms ‘character’ and ‘education’ and about the psychology of
character development. Character is gradually formed from birth through the inter-
actions of children with others; they become just or unjust, as Aristotle reminded
us, by engaging in just or unjust acts and from the example of role-models (par-
ents, siblings, peers, teachers). When formal education in character does not occur,
virtues and vices will still be caught even if they are not directly taught. There is
no alternative type of moral education that children can be exposed to at school
than character education. Character education will always take place there, and
although it can obviously be done either well or badly, concerns about character
education being paternalistic per se are simply red herrings in this context.
To sum up, no teachers can either logically or psychologically dissociate them-
selves from the practice of character education (cf. Carr, 1991, pp. 243–258). The
sensible question that can be asked about a school’s or an individual teacher’s
character-education strategy is not whether such education does occur, but whether
it is ‘intentional, conscious, planned, pro-active, organized and reflective’ or
‘assumed, unconscious, reactive, subliminal or random’ (Wiley, 1998, p. 18).
It does not require deep knowledge of curriculum theory to know which of those
two strategies is more propitious for moral learning.
However, it might be said here that I have understood the charge of paternalism
in a narrow educational sense. What is wrong about character education at school,
it could be objected, is that it is – at least when it is made into a formal curricu-
lar requirement or a core subject of study – morally and politically paternalistic.
It is not the role of schools to prescribe how people should act and it is, more
generally speaking, not the role of government to interfere in individual devel-
opment of character (cf. Evans, 2012). However, first, education in virtues is not
about prescribing, but about teaching students what a morally good life consists of.
The claim ‘It is better to be compassionate than cold-hearted’ does not imply ‘Be
compassionate!’, any more than the claim that ‘This is a good knife’ implies the
order ‘Cut!’. A common failure to acknowledge this distinction rests on a partic-









































MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION 277
implying motivation and hence prescription – called ‘motivational internalism’
(see Kristjánsson, 2013, chap. 5). Second, the charge of political paternalism fol-
lows from assuming that the ultimate role of government is only to maximise
individuals’ capacity for choice, not what that choice should be about. Apart from
the controversial nature of this assumption, an irony lurks here: if what citizens
really crave – as all of the empirical evidence seems to indicate – is for govern-
ment to maximise their well-being rather than simply their range of options (cf.
Haybron and Alexandrova, 2013), then ‘forcing them to be free to choose’ is pater-
nalistic, whereas intervening (apparently paternalistically) in their lives in order to
enhance their well-being is the essence of anti-paternalism in action.
Myth 6: ‘Education in Character and Virtue is Anti-democratic and
Anti-intellectual’
It is frequently charged that there is a psycho-moral paradox at the centre of
character education. On the one hand, the professed aim of most character
education programmes is to produce critical and independent moral choosers; on
the other hand, the dominant method prescribed by character educationists from
Aristotle onwards is ‘habituation’, which can best be defined as an intentional
process of inculcation of character by means of repeated action under outside
guidance (see Lawrence, 2011, p. 249). The psycho-moral paradox is therefore:
how can it be simultaneously true that it is the aim of moral education to develop
persons capable of autonomous engagement in rational moral conduct and that
this goal might be secured by inculcating from an early age certain ready-made
habits of action and feeling? Is heteronomously formed autonomy psychologically
possible and morally justifiable (see Kristjánsson, 2007, pp. 31–47)?
While it must be admitted that one of the most serious lacunae in Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics is a failure to explain how exactly habituated reason can be
made to morph gradually into critical thinking, the only reasonable response is that
we know with certainty that this happens. Unfortunately, moral educators since
Aristotle’s time have added little to that observation except colourful metaphors,
about the necessity of entering ‘the palace of Reason through the courtyard of
Habit and Tradition’ (Peters, 1981, p. 52), or palatable analogies such as that the
idea of critical moral thinking independent of a prior habituation process is ‘as
incoherent as supposing that we should not encourage children to learn chords
and scales on a piano until they have reached an age at which they are capable
of composing music for themselves’ (Carr, 1991, p. 244; cf. Kristjánsson, 2006,
pp. 187–188).
Practicalities aside, Aristotle does suggest that in order to take the step
from habituated virtue to full virtue, we must learn to choose the right actions
and emotions from ‘a firm and unchanging state’ of character (1985, p. 40
[1105a30–1105a34]): that is, after having submitted them to the arbitration of our
own phronesis. On this view, truly virtuous persons not only perform the right









































278 MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION
knowing them, taking intrinsic pleasure in them and deciding that they are worth-
while. This process takes time, as those who have just learnt a virtue through
habituation ‘do not yet know it, though they string the [correct] words together;
for it must grow into them’ (Aristotle, 1985, p. 180 [1147a20–1147a22]).
At all events, Aristotle’s stringent condition about the eventual moral worth of
virtuous activity – echoed by most contemporary character educationists – serves
to defuse the myth that character education is essentially anti-intellectual and anti-
democratic. For if it is, it is not really character education on the Aristotelian
understanding at all, but rather character conditioning. If the complaint is, rather,
that some particular programmes of character education – for instance, as prac-
tised in the USA in the 1990s – were delivered in an anti-intellectual and
anti-democratic way, then this may well be the case. But so much the worse for
those programmes and the students who were at the receiving end of them, rather
than for character education as such.
Myth 7: ‘The Emphasis on Character and Virtue is Conservative’
Like the term ‘paternalistic’, ‘conservative’ is also contested and multi-layered.
I refer to two of its possible meanings in this section but leave one (‘conservative’
as ‘individualistic’) until the next section on Myth 8.
The first and most obvious meaning of ‘conservative’ is ‘supportive of the
status quo’. Is the emphasis on character, virtue and virtue education conservative
in that sense? From a political perspective, this seems not to be the case at all.
Martha Nussbaum (1990) has, for instance, argued convincingly that Aristotelian
virtue-and-well-being theory, if transposed to the modern world, would have
radically reformative and progressive implications, and that its practical policies
would most probably resemble those of Scandinavian social democracies. From
an educational perspective, it seems equally far-fetched to tar virtue-theories of an
Aristotelian bent with service to the status quo. There is little doubt that the sta-
tus quo in today’s education is a technicist, instrumentalist ‘what-works approach’
(Oancea and Pring, 2008; Arthur, 2003, p. 114). An Aristotelian character-based
approach would, in contrast, highlight the role of normativity and values – not
only within values education, but in all educational efforts – and prompt us to
understand education itself non-instrumentally as a teleological praxis (cf. Biesta,
2010). It would also call for radical overhaul of the training of prospective teachers
towards more explicit immersion in moral and cultural values: philosophy, art and
literature (Carr, 1991). An approach can hardly be more anti-status quo than that.
Another meaning of ‘conservative’ is simply ‘inspired by, or in line with, the
agenda of conservative political parties’. Here, to be sure, when US-style charac-
ter education was first introduced in the late 1980s, one of its torchbearers was
William Bennett, Education Secretary in the Reagan government, and it cannot be
denied that he and many of his colleagues put their own ideological spin on the
movement’s agenda. However, such connection to the political right seems to have
been entirely contingent. If we look at the history of character-education initia-









































MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION 279
liberals and progressives, harking back to the Scottish Enlightenment, the radical-
ism of Robert Owen and the secular humanists in the late Victorian era. In recent
times, it was New Labour who first suggested that education had to take a moral
turn (witness Tony Blair, influenced by people like Geoff Mulgan and Richard
Layard) – although Tories (especially Steve Hilton, Oliver Letwin and PM David
Cameron) have recently jumped on that same bandwagon. In any event, in UK
political circles the order of the day seems to be that ‘we are all Aristotelians now’
(Arthur, 2003; Evans, 2011; History of Emotions Blog, 2012).
Myth 8: ‘Character, Virtue and Virtue Education are Individualistic Notions’
It may seem odd to fault Aristotelian ideas for individualism. Aristotle himself was
anything but an individualist, claiming that the good life could only be realised in
a certain kind of society with a certain kind of moral upbringing, public educa-
tion and political arrangements (while not forgetting his insistence on the ‘moral
luck’ of such circumstances). Nevertheless, contemporary efforts at virtue edu-
cation commonly find themselves under attack for their inherently individualist
bias. The idea of virtue is seen as focusing excessively or exclusively on the
capacities and achievements of individual students apart from their socio-cultural
contexts, thus neglecting issues of gender, class, ethnicity and power relations.
Conversely, vice is allegedly located in individual failings rather than in social,
economic and political structures – and improvement is sought through personal
change (or ‘kid-fixing’) rather than political reform.
I have elsewhere criticised these objections as directed, first, at US-style
character education of the 1990s and, second, at current positive psychologi-
cal virtue theory. The reason for the apparent foregounding of inward gaze and
personal achievement in both movements seems to be the same, at least if its advo-
cates are to be taken at their word. They all claim that the question of individual
versus societal reform is a chicken-and-egg one – we need to start somewhere
and, for developmental and pragmatic reasons, it is more feasible to start with the
individual child, student or classroom than the whole school system or society at
large: developmentally because the emotional underpinnings of the virtues are first
activated in close personal encounters and only later extended to societal concern;
and pragmatically because individual manoeuvres are simply easier to administer
in the first place than large-scale institutional transformations. Both in US-style
character education and positive psychology, the eventual goal is, however, said
to be ‘social change’ or the ‘creation of positive institutions’ (see citations and
discussions in Kristjánsson, 2006, pp. 188–189; 2013, chap. 2.5). Once again, the
charge in question turns out to be a myth.
Myth 9: ‘Character and Virtue are Essentially Relative Notions’
The obvious question to ask here is what those notions are supposed to be relative
to? One initially plausible answer might be: to a particular moral theory – a theory
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Now, it is beyond controversy that most recent inroads into virtue education
have been directly or indirectly inspired by virtue ethics – a type of moral theory,
with firm roots in antiquity, which has lately re-emerged as a serious contender to
Kantianism and utilitarianism. According to such virtue ethics, an action is right
not because it can be universalised in light of a rational principle (Kantianism) or
because it makes the greatest number of people happy (utilitarianism), but because
it enhances virtue as moral character and contributes to a flourishing life – as
opposed to a languishing or floundering one. Indeed, the focus is no longer on the
‘deontic’ correctness of individual actions, but rather on their ‘aretaic’ role in the
well-rounded life and their roots in the ‘inner world’ of the agent; in stable states of
character that incorporate motivational and emotional elements. What matters in
the end for moral evaluation is not merely observable behaviour, but the emotions
with which an action is performed, the motivation behind it and the manner in
which it is performed.
Fashionable as virtue ethics is in many quarters, it has also been much frowned
upon for alleged self-centredness and failure to give precise action-guidance in
dilemmatic situations (Kristjánsson, 2002, pp. 63–76). So if the current attention
to character, virtue and virtue education were conditional upon the acceptance of
virtue ethics in this narrow sense – as designating a particular, contestable moral
theory – one could indeed argue that such attention was unduly theory-relative.
There is, however, another and more inclusive understanding of the term ‘virtue
ethics’ where it refers simply to the thesis that a person cannot live a well-rounded
and overall satisfactory life without practising moral virtue. In this permissive
sense, one could say that almost all historical moral theories – in addition to
virtue ethics in the narrow sense – are virtue ethical, for if any creed can be
said to have stood the test of time in moral theory, it is the judgement of wise
and competent judges, wherever you go, that virtues are constitutive of the good
life. Clearly, Confucianism is virtue ethical in this sense (Yu, 2007), as also is
utilitarianism (at least on John Stuart Mill’s understanding) and even arguably
Kantianism (which has its own constrictive virtue theory) – although the last
two do not ground ultimate moral rightness in virtuous character. It is precisely
because of this broad, if uneasy, consensus that Martha Nussbaum (1999) demurs
at the term ‘virtue ethics’, as reserved for a special moral theory, and believes that
it designates a ‘misleading category’. So while it may be possible to identify some
fundamentalist divine-command theories of morality or versions of Kantianism –
entailing extreme emotional disengagement from morality – as not virtue-ethical,
we need not generally worry that a focus on character, virtue and virtue education
must remain relative to, and contingent upon, the acceptance of a particular moral
theory.
Less easy to deflect is the challenge posed by cultural relativism. This should
not be surprising, since relativism is the proverbial spectre haunting all moral theo-
rising since the time of the Greek sophists. Some virtue ethicists have not so much
tried to lay it to rest as to take it on board, most notably Alasdair MacIntyre (1981).
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times and societies or, more specifically, among the prevailing social practices
of different cultures. Nevertheless, a more common tack taken in contempo-
rary virtue ethics is to follow Aristotle’s empirical universalism/cosmopolitanism
about human nature, captured in his much-quoted observation that ‘in our travels
we can see how every human being is akin [ . . . ] to a human being’ (1985, p. 208
[1155a20–1155a22]). The case for such anti-relativism has recently been bolstered
considerably by extensive empirical work in positive psychology on conceptions
of virtues in different societies, religions and moral systems. In light of this work,
positive psychologists claim that people are more or less the same wherever they
go, and that the spheres of human life wherein our virtues and vices play out have
remained essentially constant throughout history (Peterson and Seligman, 2004).
Perhaps little more than a thought experiment would have sufficed to elicit that
same conclusion, for it is surely impossible to envisage human societies where
character strengths such as conscientiousness or courage are not needed, recog-
nised or held to be of value (see Carr, 1991, p. 6). This does not mean that
there cannot be varying interpretations or instantiations of a virtue, given different
circumstances in different societies. But then again, in some societies people drive
or the right side of the road, in some on the left; yet clearly it would be a myth to
claim that there is no such thing as the general skill of a good driver (cf. Carr,
1996, p. 359).
Myth 10: ‘Character and Virtue are Entirely Situation Specific’
It is currently fashionable to claim that moral situationism, more than moral rela-
tivism, is where theories of virtue and virtue education come unstuck. Situationists
say that there is no such thing as stable and consistent states of virtues and vices,
making up character; rather, all human behaviour (‘moral’ or otherwise) has now
been shown in psychological experiments, such as the famous Milgram experi-
ments, to be completely situation dependent. While I have elsewhere criticised
situationism (Kristjánsson, 2010, pp. 128–147; 2013), let me give it the credit
that it deserves. First, all personality psychologists seem nowadays to agree that
behaviour is a function both of character and situations. In other words, since situa-
tions are the arena where character plays out, it would be a conceptual, no less than
empirical, error to maintain that character is completely situation independent.
Second, it seems undeniable that the point of good virtue education is not only to
help students develop virtuous traits; it is also to teach them to learn to steer clear
of perilous situations with which they have no prior familiarity and which might
land them in trouble – given the common-sense dictum that the more extraordi-
nary features a situation presents, the more extraordinary and ‘out of character’
our reactions may be.
These moderate concessions aside, virtue ethicists have arguably sufficient
weaponry in their arsenal to rebut the situationist challenge. The virtue ethical
response typically culminates in an anti-behaviouristic objection, observing that
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about whether that person possesses a robust character state of virtue or vice.
In light of the characterisations of ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ from the section on Myth
1, we need to know about the spirit in which the action was performed or not
performed, its emotional concomitants and the manner in which the action or
non-action was conducted (see further in Kristjánsson, 2010, pp. 128–147).
However, there is an even more fundamental problem of which the situation-
ist challenge falls afoul, which has to do with the very concept of a ‘situation’.
Situations can range from the narrowest (‘picking up papers that someone has
dropped in front of a telephone booth after you have found a coin in the booth’)
to the broadest (‘being a citizen in Nazi Germany’). Typically, situationists delib-
erately choose to focus on situations that are not only broad but also passive (the
agent is a victim rather than a creator of the situation), extraordinary (the situa-
tions presents features that the agent has never experienced before and is never
even likely to experience in real life) and/or involve strong social expectations
of compliance (for instance, being subjected to orders from an authority-figure).
After tilting evidence in their favour in this way, it is no surprise that situation-
ist experiments yield the findings that they do. This is not even a matter that
requires empirical corroboration; rather, it is what the very terms ‘broad’, ‘pas-
sive’, ‘extraordinary’ and ‘strong’ mean when applied to situations. They are used
in our language precisely to denote classes of situations where people’s reactions
are less easily predictable than they normally are (Kristjánsson, 2013, chap. 6).
We should not labour under the illusion that evidence gathered in this way poses a
serious threat to the ideas of character, virtue and virtue education as such.
3. SOME WELL-FOUNDED MISGIVINGS
I do not want to create the impression that there are obvious common-sense
answers to all the objections that can be levelled at practical virtue ethics, and
that the people who are currently engaged in virtue-based educational research
can simply adopt a cavalier gung-ho approach to them. For all I have said so far,
there might be remaining misgivings that are more difficult to handle than those
already addressed. I now turn to three of these in the final sections of this paper.
‘The History of Virtue Educational Initiatives does not Augur Well for the
Prospects of Future Ones’
Speaking from a practical UK-based context, James Arthur laments that Britain
has ‘a long history of ill-conceived and ineffective efforts at character education’
(2003, p. 24). One difficulty lies in the endless flavour-of-the-month varieties that
have been on offer, one after the other, which have created a dismissive cry-wolf
attitude among teacher as well as simple initiative fatigue. The lack of a com-
mon language in which those efforts have been couched has not made life easier
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another’ (Haldane, 2010, p. xi), and moral education theory is no exception. Thus,
we urgently need a passkey – some sort of a moral GPS – to guide us through the
labyrinth of terms, theories and approaches (cf. Berkowitz, 2012).
In this regard, all serviceable work in the area of virtue education nowadays
needs to be interdisciplinary: to integrate insights from philosophy, psychol-
ogy and education. In the present context, we need as a matter of urgency to
acknowledge that there cannot be a serviceable social scientific theory of virtue
or of its constitutive elements without significant input from philosophical virtue
ethics, any more than there can be a reasonably developed philosophical theory
of virtue without grounding in the empirical knowledge of how people actually
think about virtues and the way virtues actually inform their character. However,
this acknowledgement may be a hard bullet to bite for many academics and
practitioners.
‘The Study of Virtue and Character Lacks a Clear Empirical Methodology’
Virtue ethics is a type of moral naturalism. Moral naturalists are realists about
morality; they believe that such moral properties as honesty or wickedness really
are features of the natural world (on a par with such other ordinary properties as
swiftness, redness and slipperiness) or, more specifically, constitute ingredients
of biologically evolved human psychology and conduct. For the naturalist, judge-
ments about moral life are true if they correspond to this natural reality, false
if they do not. The great majority of existing instruments to measure character –
for instance, the positive psychological Values in Action instruments for youth and
adults (Park and Peterson, 2006) – are, however, simple self-report questionnaires.
Self-report measures are typically grounded in anti-realism or, more specifically,
attributionism about the human self, according to which the self is the same as
self-concept or the set of beliefs we attribute to the self. Moral naturalists com-
plain about possible response biases in such measures caused by self-deceptions
and self-fabulations. Even if I consistently think I am a duck, this does not make
me a duck (Kristjánsson, 2010, pp. 25–52).
In response, the anti-realist may ask what sorts of measures the realist has then
devised to measure, say, objective moral virtue (rather than simply people’s own
conceptions of how virtuous they are), and the answer is not readily forthcoming.
The realist may suggest triangulation via reports of peers and significant others
(teachers, parents, siblings, etc.), but the snag is now that even if not only I think
I am a duck but other people too, this still does not make me a duck. Multiple
observations of the person (e.g. on multiple occasions or in multiple contexts) may
be helpful, but longitudinal observation methods are time-consuming, costly and
difficult to administer. To cut a long story short, no tried-and-tested instruments to
measure moral character – on a naturalist–realist conception – seem to exist. That
lacuna calls any virtue educational school interventions into question, as those
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impact on moral virtue. At best, such impact can now be measured by relying
on anecdotal evidence or using instruments that the naturalist–realist deems, in
principle, inadequate.
I see no other way out of this predicament for current character educators
and virtue researchers than to try to design their own tests for measuring virtue
– or at least to search for eclectic multi-criterial combinations of already existing
measures that work better in tandem than individually (cf. Kristjánsson, 2010,
pp. 51–52). To complicate matters, such measures need to be age specific, as
young people will exhibit different virtues at different stages of their moral devel-
opment. Given the current state of play, there is clearly good reason to remain
circumspect about such methodological issues.
‘We Know Very Little about the Impact of Previous Interventions in this Field’
Until recently, one might have been excused for thinking that serious scholarship
was automatically on holiday when it came to evaluations of existing programmes
of character education. In the last few years, meta-analyses of impact have started
to appear – some presenting positive results and helpful recommendations about
‘what works’ in character education (Berkowitz and Bier, 2006; Lovat et al., 2009;
Durlak et al., 2011). Hampering such studies, however, is the methodological
issue discussed in the previous section. In referring to effectiveness, this is gener-
ally measured via self-reports or other reports rather than more objective criteria.
When purely objective criteria are invoked – for example, the number of violent
incidents in the school yard or the number of students found carrying knives –
questions remain about how to interpret positive findings: Do they really mean
that there has been an improvement in virtue/character, or only that students have
devised better ways of not being found out? On the other hand, we could decide to
be more charitable and say that if a programme of character education has had a
marked positive effect on school ethos, as measured by some objective standards,
we should simply be thankful for that and not worry too much about the underlying
mechanisms.
Once again, however, healthy realism about the short-term effects of virtue
education seems advisable. In the British context, for example, it does well to
remember that the best effects of virtue education programmes have usually been
recorded in private schools. But only 7% of children presently attend such schools
in the United Kingdom.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have explored various well-known and often-repeated anti-virtue
catechisms, stating that the notions of character, virtue and virtue education
are unclear, redundant, old-fashioned, religious, paternalistic, anti-democratic,
conservative, individualistic, relative and situation dependent. I have challenged
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other hand, I ended the paper on a more conciliatory note by acknowledging three
well-founded misgivings – historical, methodological and practical – about the
notions in question.
If efforts at virtue research and development are endangered by underestima-
tion of possible impact, they are no less crippled by overestimation. Well-founded
misgivings about virtue education do remain – although those are not the misgiv-
ings most commonly highlighted by sceptics. To conclude, we need to take the
long view and tread carefully over a bumpy terrain – although that is not the same
as treading timidly. At all events, the ambitious transformative aims of current
efforts at virtue education, however laudable, need to be mitigated by a substantive
dose of intellectual modesty.
5. REFERENCES
Allport, G. W. (1937) Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York, Holt).
Annas, J. (2011) Intelligent Virtue (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958) Modern moral philosophy, Philosophy, 33 (1), 1–19.
Aristotle (1985) Nicomachean Ethics (T. Irwin, Trans.) (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing).
Arthur, J. (2003) Education with Character: The Moral Economy of Schooling (London,
RoutledgeFalmer).
Arthur, J. (2010) Of Good Character: Exploration of Virtues and Values in 3–25 Year-olds
(Exeter, Imprint Academic).
Baumeister, R. F., Campbell, J. D., Krueger, J. I. and Vohs, K. D. (2003) Does high
self-esteem cause better performance, interpersonal success, happiness, or healthier
lifestyles? Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 4 (1), 1–44.
Berkowitz, M. (2012) Navigating the Semantic Minefield of Promoting Moral Development.
Available at: http://amenetwork.org/oped/ (accessed 12 April 2012).
Berkowitz, M. W. and Bier, M. C. (2006) What Works in Character Education: A Research-
driven Guide for Educators. Washington, DC: Character Education Partnership.
Available at: http://characterandcitizenship.org/research/wwceforpractitioners.pdf
(accessed 12 April 2012).
Biesta, G. J. J. (2010) Why ‘what works’ still won’t work. From evidence-based education
to value-based education, Studies in Philosophy and Education, 29 (5), 491–503.
Carr, D. (1991) Educating the Virtues: Essay on the Philosophical Psychology of Moral
Development and Education (London, Routledge).
Carr, D. (1996) After Kohlberg: some implications of an ethics of virtue for the theory
of moral education and development, Studies in Philosophy and Education, 15 (4),
353–370.
Cigman, R. (2004) Situated self-esteem, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 38 (1),
91–105.
Curren, R. (2010) Aristotle’s educational politics and the Aristotelian renaissance in
philosophy of education, Oxford Review of Education, 36 (5), 543–559.
Durlak, J. A., Weissberg, R. P., Dymnicki, A. B., Taylor, R. D. and Schellinger, K. B. (2011)
The impact of enhancing students’ social and emotional learning: a meta-analysis of
school-based universal interventions, Child Development, 82 (1), 405–432.
Evans, J. (2011) Our leaders are all Aristotelians now, Public Policy Research, 17 (4),
214–221.
Evans, J. (2012) The Vickys: Can You be Paternalist Without being Patronising? Available
at: http://www.globaldashboard.org/2012/05/20/the-vickys-can-you-be-paternalist-









































286 MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION
Haldane, J. (2010) Preface. In J. Arthur (Ed.) Citizens of Character: New Directions in
Character and Values Education (Exeter, Imprint Academic), xi–xv.
Haybron, D. M. and Alexandrova, A. (2013) Paternalism in economics. In C. Coons and
M. Weber (Eds) Paternalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press), in press.
History of Emotions Blog (2012) James O’Shaughnessy on How the Tories got the Well-
being Bug. Available at: http://emotionsblog.history.qmul.ac.uk/?p=1367 (accessed
11 October 2012).
Kesebir, P. and Kesebir, S. (2012) The cultural salience of moral character and virtue
declined in twentieth century America, Journal of Positive Psychology, 7 (6),
471–480.
Kristjánsson, K. (2002) Justifying Emotions: Pride and Jealousy (London, Routledge).
Kristjánsson, K. (2006) Justice and Desert-based Emotions (Aldershot, Ashgate).
Kristjánsson, K. (2007) Aristotle, Emotions and Education (Aldershot, Ashgate).
Kristjánsson, K. (2010) The Self and its Emotions (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press).
Kristjánsson, K. (2013) Virtues and Vices in Positive Psychology: A Philosophical Critique
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Lawrence, G. (2011) Acquiring character: becoming grown-up. In M. Pakaluk and
G. Pearson (Eds) Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle (Oxford, Oxford
University Press), 233–283.
Lovat, T., Toomey, R., Dally, K. and Clement, N. (2009) Project to test and mea-
sure the impact of values education on student effects and school ambience.
Final report for Australian government. Available at: http://www.valueseducation.edu.
au/verve/_resources/Project_to_Test_and_Measure_the_Impact_of_Values_Education.
pdf (accessed 11 April 2012).
MacIntyre, A. (1981) After Virtue (London, Duckworth).
Nussbaum, M. C. (1990) Aristotelian social democracy. In R. Douglass, G. Mara and H.
Richardson (Eds) Liberalism and the Good (London, Routledge), 203–252.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1999) Virtue ethics: a misleading category? Journal of Ethics, 3 (3),
163–201.
Oancea, A. and Pring, R. (2008) The importance of being thorough: on systematic accu-
mulations of ‘what works’ in education research, Journal of Philosophy of Education,
42 (S1), 15–39.
Park, N. and Peterson, C. (2006) Moral competence and character strengths among adoles-
cents: the development and validation of the values in action inventory of strengths for
youth, Journal of Adolescence, 29 (6), 891–909.
Peters, R. S. (1981) Moral Development and Moral Education (London, George Allen and
Unwin).
Peterson, C. and Seligman, M. E. P. (2004) Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook
and Classification (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Riots Communities and Victims’ Panel (2012) Final Report. Available at: http://riotspanel.
independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Riots-Panel-Final-Report1.pdf
(accessed 11 October 2012).
Seligman, M. E. P., Ernst, R. M., Gillham, J., Reivich, K. and Linkins, M. (2009)
Positive education: positive psychology and classroom interventions, Oxford Review
of Education, 35 (3), 293–311.
Smith, R. (2006) On diffidence: the moral psychology of self-belief, Journal of Philosophy
of Education, 40 (1), 51–62.
Wiley, L. S. (1998) Comprehensive Character-building Classrooms: A Handbook for
Teachers (Manchester, NH, Character Development Foundation).









































MYTHS ABOUT VIRTUE EDUCATION 287
Correspondence
Kristján Kristjánsson
Professor of Character Education and Virtue Ethics




Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
E-mail: k.kristjansson@bham.ac.uk
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
O
kl
ah
om
a 
L
ib
ra
ri
es
] 
at
 1
3:
43
 1
4 
D
ec
em
be
r 
20
15
 
